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More ambitiously, it could encourage and directly support development of technologies geared less towards power projection and more towards repelling invasion, such as cheap anti-ship missiles and UAVs,  the potential for which was again recently demonstrated in the fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, any effort to strengthen Taiwan carries an unavoidable risk of emboldening its governments and increasing the perceived space for pro-independence behaviour.
The foundation for a wider US option set is therefore supporting Taiwan in an enhanced investment in its own defence. There are ready-made models for an alternative approach, ones which reflect a well-established US tradition of supporting clients or allies short of going to war. During the early Cold War, it answered Soviet blockades of Berlin with airlifts of supplies rather than military action. It played armourer and supplier to Israel during several Middle East wars.
During the s, it provided support to resistance and insurgent groups — most notably in Afghanistan. Taiwan would merely be the latest in a string of US partners who benefited from these less-than-absolute types of support. The elements laid out briefly below certainly require more analysis and elaboration. As it develops such ideas, Washington should seek the greatest multilateral cooperation possible. Japanese, Australian, and European attitudes towards China have been hardening.
None of these countries is anxious to join a war for Taiwan, but all might be increasingly willing to push the boundaries of their policy to help deter and, if necessary, punish such aggression in other ways. While some commentators speak in terms of a no-notice Chinese attack, most recognise that there would be considerable warning time before an invasion.
Such an effort could include expanded intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISR assets including persistent drones ,  proliferated sensors, and space-based surveillance. Washington could join with allies to help fund a Taiwanese equivalent of Bellingcat  to watch open-source intelligence for signs of impending invasion or blockade as well as grey zone harassment campaigns, and help rally global opinion if war or blockade loomed.
The purpose of such enhanced warning time would be not only military — giving Taiwan more time to mobilise reserves and prepare for missile and air strikes — but also political. If China confronts the prospect of being bombarded with warnings and condemnations as it plans for war, it may be less likely to start down that road. Conversely, were China to avoid such scrutiny in the interim pre-war crisis by launching a sudden surprise attack, it would have to risk doing so without proper material preparation, from a standing start.
Such a move would transfer the burden of escalatory risk to Washington, which would have to force the blockade if it chose to deliver supplies, thus risking conflict. The United States could help Taiwan prepare for such a contingency by enhancing Taiwanese self-sufficiency in food, energy, and other necessities. It could rally multilateral statements opposing any such blockade and promising to deliver, through UN or other nongovernmental auspices, specific critical supplies such as medicine.
It could develop and communicate specific punishments it would levy on China in the event of such a scenario and coordinate such punishments with other countries. In the event of coercion or invasion, the United States could support Taiwan in ways other than committing the US military. Especially during a campaign of coercion short of war, it could offer non-military supplies and assistance ranging from food and medicine to support in global financial markets.
Washington could share its own intelligence and battlefield awareness during both crisis and wartime. The Nixon administration organised a massive relief effort of military supplies — over 55 tons, delivered by air and sea, including transferring possession of more than US F-4 fighter-bombers, A-4 Skyhawks, and C transports.
Conducting such resupply for Taiwan during wartime would probably not be possible without engaging in the war, but the United States and others could be poised to conduct such a support operation in the window of strategic warning before an actual attack. Such a concept could be linked to enhanced roles for Taiwanese reserve forces, some of which could be trained to operate these systems.
Openly or covertly, the United States might help Taiwan to build a network of state-supported hackers abroad, groups that could continue to impose costs on China for months or years after an invasion or occupation has occurred. Even a United States that remained out of the fight, moreover, would impose operational military costs on the PLA. Regardless of its expectations of US involvement, Beijing would have to account for the possibility that the war would escalate accidentally, or that the United States would decide at some point during the fighting to jump in.
To hedge against such risks, even a PLA fully committed to a Taiwan blockade or invasion would have to reserve significant forces to mitigate the danger of a delayed American blow. The United States could develop concepts to posture its forces before and in the early stages of a war in ways that maximised these hedging requirements.
A riskier step would be to launch deniable blows of various kinds on Chinese forces, to disrupt and weaken their invasion. They could include covert intelligence programs to sabotage Chinese infrastructure directly supporting the invasion. They could involve kinetic attacks from partly deniable capabilities: the growing potential of unmanned systems, for example undersea drones, could offer new possibilities in this area, as could unmanned systems for deploying mines, either prepositioned or moved into position in a crisis.
The United States could employ a small number of torpedo- and missile-firing mini-submarines which Taiwan would claim as its own. Such covert but direct involvement would risk escalation if the US role were uncovered, or suspected. It could be justified on the expectation that, as in many Cold War cases of proxy conflict such as US support for the Afghan mujahideen, China would prefer to join in the pretence — to absorb these blows rather than generate a direct crisis and bring down the effect of the whole US military.
Such a dynamic might emerge only if the United States stayed out of the conflict in formal terms. China would have an incentive to accept a certain amount of harassment rather than escalate and risk drawing the United States in. Still, such direct but covert involvement would carry risk.
A central part of any US and international strategy to deter and punish Chinese aggression against Taiwan must be broad-based, non-military punitive measures. In the event of blockade or attack, the United States could lead an international coalition in applying economic, political, and cultural sanctions. This could include a program for gradual economic decoupling — something few countries are willing to consider today, but which could be promoted as a geopolitical necessity in the wake of an attack.
It could include a freeze on all US assets in China and an end to dollar-based transactions. It could seek to confiscate selected Chinese-operated and owned investments around the world. It would involve a new effort to acquire iron-clad commitments freezing Chinese information technologies companies out of the digital infrastructures of other countries.
The United States could begin to lay the groundwork for these steps before a crisis or war. US officials could generate draft prohibitions on contact with Chinese industry, scholars or scientists, and a total ban on educational exchanges, which would be put into effect after an attack. It could design and threaten a global public relations campaign to condemn the Chinese leadership and lead an effort to throw China out of a host of international organisations.
The United States might even indicate that an attack on Taiwan would be the one event which would cause it to abandon its One China policy, formally recognise Taiwan as an independent state, and support a government in exile. The prospect of these actions alone may not deter China,  but they would influence the balance of power after an attack. Rising powers want and need legitimation narratives that justify their growing influence to the international community.
The United States could also take steps to ensure that a Chinese attack would usher in a more elaborate and forward-leaning posture by the United States and its partners, which along with enhanced local defence efforts would confront Beijing with a stronger multilateral blocking position in the region.
Most countries in the region do not favour more US forces or facilities on their territory, or steps to cooperate too closely with the United States in preparing for war against China. This would presumably change to some degree in the aftermath of an attack. Washington can work now to establish the outlines of what such a bolstered US and multilateral position would look like, along with added mutual support among the countries of the region.
Some observers fear any agenda which provides the United States with options short of war. First, options from our list, starting with significant new efforts from Taiwan, would enhance deterrence in concrete ways not likely to be outweighed by any doubts about US intentions. Second, if it chooses, the United States can reaffirm its current policy of ambiguity in many ways, from public statements to forward-postured naval forces and specific warnings in a crisis.
Most fundamentally, it would be irresponsible for the United States to leave itself no option in the event of Chinese aggression other than total war; if the development of a wider set of credible deterrent and punitive options carries risks, those should be accepted and minimised. It would be strategic folly for the United States to implicitly burn its bridges in service of a commitment that is itself qualified and uncertain. US officials and national security experts once spoke zealously about the importance of Indochina and the need to affirm US credibility by holding the line against communism.
And yet, presidents from Dwight Eisenhower through Richard Nixon doubted that even a vigorous US effort would bring success. The parallels between the dilemmas of Vietnam and Taiwan are instructive. A growing certainty in the United States that regional and global security hinges on a single contest. The conviction that there is no middle ground—that to deter and punish aggression, the United States must prepare to fight the war itself.
The result in Vietnam was to compel the fighting of an unnecessary war, and the United States may be sliding towards a similar abyss over Taiwan — but this time the stakes are far higher. This time, the dilemma could trap the United States in precisely the outcome it seeks to avert — a major war with a nuclear-armed China.
It could lead to the devastation of the US military, a collapse of public support for power projection in Asia, an America fatally weakened for the broader competition with China and in its position elsewhere, and —perhaps— a nuclear exchange.
Washington ought to think along indirect lines, rather than planning to directly engage with every aggression it hopes to deter. Such an approach demands fresh thinking, before it is too late. Some 75 per cent of those polled agreed with the statement that their nation is already an independent entity. In December , then-Assistant Secretary of State of East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell gave a public speech which, while indicating that the basic components of US policy were not changing, promised increased economic and diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
For Michael Mazarr, the United States should develop every possible policy option that provides alternatives to going to war, knowing that the actual choice will be governed by the specific context in which it arises. For Patrick Porter, the presumption against going to war should be stronger.
We do not deal with this argument here; the issue of global semiconductor supplies is an important strategic question but demands policy action distinct from military defence of Taiwan. Taiwan is the classic canary in the coal mine. Abandoning Taiwan would send a shock wave through American security alliances and would mark the end of US leadership in the Indo-Pacific. Those authors are generally sceptical of the role of reputation and credibility as a general rule; other treatments affirm their importance but in qualified and contingent ways.
They probably also calculate — based in part on having observed the US example — that possessing it would be both burdensome and unsustainable. But that does not make this domino scenario any less compelling for many today. However, as with all domino theories, there is no way to know in advance if worst-case projections would actually occur.
It demonstrates that the island is just over kilometres to Tokyo, over to Hawaii, to Guam, over to Seoul and to Singapore. If you take his map and move the centre of measurements just slightly to the left — to place it over far eastern mainland China — the ranges do not change in strategically significant ways. The one place where territories lie within the potentially extended arc of a Taiwan-based intelligence and air defence network is two sets of Japanese-administered islands which lay roughly to kilometres west or north-west of Taiwan: the contested Senkaku Islands and the islands of Taketomi, Ishigaki, Tarama, and Miyako.
Even here, however, the improved strategic position offered by bases on Taiwan is hardly essential. It would reduce the range to the Senkakus, for example, from about kilometres to about , and to Ishigaki from about kilometres to about Given the significant number of Chinese strike systems with ranges well beyond kilometres, and its expanding naval expeditionary capability, it is not clear that an extra kilometres of range would make the decisive difference in any fight over these islands. Yet the location and potential operating areas for Chinese submarines reduce the significance of this role.
It could send its boats to sea days or weeks before a conflict. Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in. Defence spending in grew only 0. William Murray has offered one of the best summaries of what such an asymmetric strategy would look like. Key elements of his proposed strategy including hardening and enhanced resilience for command and control and military facilities; a stronger and more redundant national power and communications infrastructure; a more professional volunteer force equipped with the most modern anti-invasion weapons; large numbers of decoys; use of smaller and more concealable systems, such as man-portable and small, truck-mounted anti-aircraft systems and anti-ship missiles; and stockpiles of critical materials to withstand a blockade for weeks or months.
Will It? I can not tell you, said the President with vehemence, how bitterly opposed I am to such a course of action. This war in Indochina would absorb our troops by divisions! Latest Research. Rules Based Audio: What are we getting wrong about online manipulation? Frontier Rules: Emerging tech and challenges to the rules-based order.
Upcoming Events. Australia in the World. Global Economy. Latest Articles, by Issue. Log in Sign up Back Login Sign up. Analyses 20 May Patrick Porter , Michael Mazarr. Key Findings There is a growing bipartisan consensus in Washington on a tighter embrace of Taiwan, which may soon become a stronger implied US commitment to go to war in the event of a Chinese invasion. Taiwan matters to US security and the regional order, and the United States should continue to make clear that aggression is unacceptable.
But those advocating a stronger US security commitment exaggerate the strategic consequences of a successful Chinese invasion. The stakes are not so high as to warrant an unqualified US pledge to go to war. American decision-makers, like their forebears confronting the seeming threat of communism in Indochina, may be trapping themselves into an unnecessarily stark conception of the consequences of a successful Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
It would be irresponsible for the United States to leave itself no option in the event of Chinese aggression other than war. But nor should Washington abandon Taiwan. There is a prudent middle way: the United States should act as armourer, but not guarantor. It should help prepare Taiwan to defend itself, to raise costs against aggression, and develop means of punishing China with non-military tools.
Executive Summary. The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier. Image: Wikimedia Commons. The Alternative. The Foundation: Strengthening Taiwan The first and most important component of such a US approach would be for the United States to serve as armourer rather than guarantor, to help Taiwan strengthen its own ability to defeat an invasion. President Tsai Ing-wen posted this image to her Twitter account on 24 March , accompanied by the text, "As the world grapples with the severity of the COVID19 pandemic, China's military maneuvers around Taiwan have continued unabated.
Whether it's national defence or preventing the spread of disease, our armed forces remain as vigilant as ever. Unmanned aerial vehicles UAVs are a key surveillance capability. China's WJ high-altitude, long-endurance and high-speed armed reconnaissance drone makes its maiden flight on 11 January Backing into a War for Lack of Options. Related Content. View More. Analyses Unregulated population migration and other future drivers of instability in the Pacific By Rita Parker.
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